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(p. 253) 17. Economic Security 

(p. 253) 17. Economic Security
Chapter:
(p. 253) 17. Economic Security
Author(s):

Gary M. Shiffman

DOI:
10.1093/hepl/9780198804109.003.0017
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date: 31 October 2020

This chapter examines the concept of economic security as a framework for analysing and countering organized violence. It first provides a brief historical overview of the economic science of security and applies economic theory to Security Studies. Through various case studies, this approach allows the reader to understand how states leverage traditional economic tools to influence, alter, and deter another actor’s behaviour. The chapter considers three categories of organized violence: warfare, crime, and insurgency. It shows that the various decision makers involved in combating organized violence have different goals and face different constraints. It also describes five vectors of economic incentives: goals, resource constraints, institutional constraints, information, and time. Finally, it discusses four economic tools of security policy: sanctions, trade, finance, and aid.

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