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(p. 52) 3. Cooperation and Conflict in the Global Political Economy 

(p. 52) 3. Cooperation and Conflict in the Global Political Economy
(p. 52) 3. Cooperation and Conflict in the Global Political Economy

Vinod K. Aggarwal

and Cédric Dupont

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date: 31 October 2020

This chapter explores the problems of cooperation and conflict in the Global Political Economy (GPE). In situations of global interdependence, individual action by states often does not produce the desired result. Many argue that the solution to the problem of interdependence is to create international institutions, but this approach itself raises the issue of how states might go about creating such institutions in the first place. This chapter examines the conditions under which states might wish to take joint action and considers game theory as an approach to understanding interdependent decision-making. It also discusses the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be developed and how they may facilitate international cooperation. Finally, it looks at dimensions of institutional variation, focusing on factors that shape the design of international institutions.

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