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(p. 228) 15. Institutional Design in New Democracies 

(p. 228) 15. Institutional Design in New Democracies
Chapter:
(p. 228) 15. Institutional Design in New Democracies
Author(s):

Matthijs Bogaards

DOI:
10.1093/hepl/9780198732280.003.0015
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date: 21 August 2019

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as an independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages, and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.

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