Show Summary Details
Page of

(p. 137) 8. Intelligence and Strategy 

(p. 137) 8. Intelligence and Strategy
Chapter:
(p. 137) 8. Intelligence and Strategy
Author(s):

Roger Z. George

DOI:
10.1093/hepl/9780198708919.003.0009
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD POLITICS TROVE (www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Politics Trove for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 20 June 2019

This chapter explores the role of intelligence in strategy. It first explains what intelligence is and how strategists have talked about its utility before discussing the development of U.S. intelligence in its early efforts to support cold war strategies of containment and deterrence and in its more recent support to strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It then examines the challenges and causes of ‘strategic surprise’, focusing on the historical cases of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the 11 September 2001 attacks. It also describes some of the new challenges faced by intelligence after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in dealing with the new ‘big data’ problem.

Access to the complete content on Politics Trove requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.