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(p. 285) 13. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process 

(p. 285) 13. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process
(p. 285) 13. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process

Avi Shlaim

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date: 13 June 2021

This chapter examines the landmark series of negotiations between Arabs and Israelis in the early 1990s, culminating in the Oslo accords of 1993. The U.S.-sponsored peace process between Israel and the Arabs was one of the salient strands in the international relations of the Middle East in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. On the Arab side, the principal participants were Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. This chapter analyses the emergence, development, and breakdown of the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the two principal parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict, from 1991 to 2001. It considers the conclusion of the Oslo accord, the implementation of the accord, Oslo II, the Camp David summit, and the return to violence. The chapter argues that the Oslo peace process failed because Israel, under the leadership of the Likud Party, reneged on its side of the deal.

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