Do ideas affect foreign policy, and if so, how? This chapter examines the claim that neoconservative ideas about foreign policy were decisive in persuading the George W. Bush administration to launch a preventive war against Iraq in March 2003. It identifies the key tenets of neoconservative foreign policy thought and shows that some of its major advocates won key positions in the Bush administration. However, the argument of the chapter is that, by itself, neoconservatism provides only a partial explanation of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A more satisfactory explanation would need to incorporate the following: the 9/11 attacks, the strategic placement of neoconservative ideas by its advocates in calmer times, the assumption that the United States would have no trouble waging a successful war, and the one percent doctrine. It is the combination of these events, ideas, and probability estimates that tipped the balance in favour of war.
Chapter
16. Neoconservatism and the domestic sources of US foreign policy
The role of ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Yuen Foong Khong
Chapter
16. Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East
Raffaella A. Del Sarto
This chapter explores the evolution and development of relations between the European Union (EU) and its member states and the Mediterranean Middle East. It considers Europe’s colonial legacy in the Middle East and the geographic proximity and complex nature of the ties that link both areas to each other. It also looks at factors that have shaped a relationship that contrasts with the Middle East’s relations with the more distant United States. The chapter assesses the different interests that have driven European policies towards the Middle East and their impact, including the responses and strategies of the Middle East’s governments vis-à-vis European policies. It assesses Europe’s role in the quest to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its responses to the aftermath of the Arab uprising that resulted in major regional instability in the Middle East and a massive increase in the number of refugees and migrants trying to reach Europe.
Chapter
10. The national security state
Robert G. Patman
This chapter traces the development of the national security state as a US foreign policy actor to the early stages of the Cold War. However, the US national security state persisted in the post-Cold War era and after 9/11 experienced a massive expansion in what was called the global war on terrorism. The central argument that emerges from the chapter is that the model of the national security state is not only a potential threat to US democracy, but also constitutes an impediment to a US recognition in the 21st century that key security problems increasingly require multilateral solutions.
Chapter
15. The Cuban Missile Crisis
Graham Allison
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 remains the defining event of the nuclear age and the most dangerous moment in recorded history. It has become the textbook case not just for nuclear diplomacy but for statecraft in relations between nuclear-weapon states. In the ongoing confrontation with Russia’s President Putin, American leaders have reviewed what President John F. Kennedy did in this crisis for lessons and clues that can be applied to the challenge of the day. For students of international affairs, the Missile Crisis offers the best-documented crisis in history, thanks in particular to tape recordings of most of the White House meetings. This makes it possible to vicariously experience the deliberations of those who considered choices they knew could lead to nuclear war. It also allows us to reconstruct the calculations of both nations as they made choices. Three decision-making models provide lenses for students of foreign policy seeking to understand the behaviour of governments as rational, organizational, and governmental actors.
Chapter
17. The EU and the USA: Competitive Cooperation in a Turbulent World
Michael Smith and Rebecca Steffenson
This chapter examines the evolution of the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with the United States. More specifically, it looks at the ways in which EU–US relations enter into the international relations of the EU as well as the implications for key areas of the EU’s growing international activity. The chapter begins with an overview of the changing shape and focus of the EU–US relationship as it enters into economic, political, and security questions. It then considers the impact of EU–US relations on the EU’s system of international relations, on the EU’s role in the processes of international relations, and on the EU’s position as a ‘power’ in international relations. It shows that the EU–US relationship has played a key (and contradictory) role in development of the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms.
Chapter
24. Energy Security
Sam Raphael and Doug Stokes
This chapter examines growing concerns over global energy security, as continuing demand for fossil fuels by industrialized economies is matched by increasing uncertainties over future energy reserves. With a particular focus on the politics of oil (which remains the key global energy source), it will assess the ways in which increasing energy insecurity amongst the world’s major powers will impact upon international security more broadly, and will discuss different understandings of the likelihood of future ‘resource wars’ and a new era of geo-political rivalry. The chapter will also examine the impact that the search for energy security by states in the Global North has upon the human security of communities in the oil-rich Global South. Finally, the chapter will examine the central role played by the USA in underpinning global energy security in the post-war era, and the impact that this has had for oil-rich regions.
Chapter
15. The Return to Confrontation, 1979–80
This chapter examines why the United States and the Soviet Union returned to confrontation during the period 1979–80. Despite the slow progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), there were at least some efforts to control strategic weapons. Short-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in contrast, continued to grow in number and sophistication, particularly in Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces still prepared for war against each other, despite détente. The failure to control theatre nuclear weapons led to a new twist in the European arms race at the end of the 1970s which helped to undermine recent improvements in East–West relations. The chapter first considers NATO’s ‘dual-track’ decision regarding theatre nuclear weapons, before discussing the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It concludes with an assessment of the revival of the Cold War, focusing on the so-called Carter Doctrine.
Chapter
10. The Vietnam War
This chapter focuses on US involvement in the Vietnam War. Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the Vietnam conflict in difficult circumstances. He had not been elected president in his own right and so, perhaps, believed that he should carry on with John F. Kennedy’s policies. It was unclear what exactly Kennedy would have done in Vietnam, but Johnson retained his predecessor’s foreign policy team and did not question the basic principle of America’s foreign policy, which called for communism to be resisted. The chapter first considers the escalation of US involvement in Vietnam during the period 1963–5 before discussing the conflict between the US and North Vietnam in the succeeding years, along with the Tet offensive and its implications. It concludes with an assessment of Richard Nixon’s decision to restart large-scale US bombing of North Vietnam.
Chapter
11. Other Regional Conflicts
This chapter examines conflicts in Latin America, South-East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East during the Cold War in which the United States and the Soviet Union were involved. Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to escalate the war in Vietnam may have been encouraged in the spring of 1965 by events in the Caribbean, where armed intervention by US Marines put a quick end to a supposed communist menace in the Dominican Republic. Arguably, this action reflected a change of priorities from the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies, when there were hopes of the US stimulating Latin American economic development. The chapter first considers US intervention in the Dominican Republic before discussing the Malaysia–Indonesia ‘confrontation’ of 1963–1966, the Indo–Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, and the Six Day War in 1967 between Arabs and Israelis.
Chapter
12. An Era of Negotiations, 1972–3
This chapter examines the negotiations pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. The most dramatic change in international diplomacy in the early 1970s was the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington. After two decades of enmity, it was announced on 15 July 1971 that Richard Nixon was to visit China. The ‘Opening to China’ was in accord with the Nixon–Kissinger hope of maintaining a favourable position vis-à-vis the Soviets despite America’s problems in Vietnam. The chapter first considers the so-called ‘triangular diplomacy’ involving the US, USSR, and China as well as the East Asian balance, before discussing the Moscow Summit and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). It concludes with an assessment of the Nixon administration’s Vietnam settlement in 1972–3 via the Paris peace accords.
Chapter
13. ‘Stagflation’ and the Trials of Détente, 1973–6
This chapter examines the onset of the so-called stagflation and the problems that beset détente during the period 1973–6. In the aftermath of Israel’s victories in the Six Day War, a situation of ‘no peace, no war’ prevailed in the Middle East. Attempts in 1970 and 1971 by the United Nations and the United States to make progress on a peace settlement proved futile. The chapter first considers the Middle East War of October 1973, which sparked a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, before discussing the impact of stagflation, especially on the Bretton Woods system. It then explores political problems in Europe and how European détente reached a high point in the Helsinki conference of 1975. It concludes with an analysis of détente and crises in less developed countries such as Chile, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.
Chapter
5. Soviet–American Relations: Avoiding Hot War and the Search for Stability
This chapter examines US–Soviet relations during the Cold War as well as the question of the genuineness of efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve disarmament and resolve troublesome disputes. It begins with a discussion of the German question, noting that Germany’s future position was vital to the future of Europe and a particular concern of the Soviets. It then considers the progress of arms control and peace efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union, before concluding with an analysis of the relationship of arms control to the use of armaments in hot war and to some aspects of fighting the Cold War.
Chapter
6. Maintaining the Spheres of Influence
This chapter examines how the United States and the Soviet Union tried to maintain their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War, especially in three regions: Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Latin America. The death of Joseph Stalin and the assumption of power by the triumvirate of Lavrenti Beria, Nikita Khrushchev, and Georgi Malenkov resulted in a fresh approach to domestic issues and to the nature of Soviet control over its European satellites. The apparent change produced a new Soviet approach to East–West relations. The chapter first considers how the new Soviet leadership addressed the crisis in East Germany before analysing American influence in Western Europe and US relations with Latin America. The discussion covers themes and events such as the Soviet policy on Hungary and Poland, the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, nuclear cooperation and multilateral force, and the US response to the Cuban Revolution.
Chapter
7. Fighting the Cold War: The Offensive Strategies
This chapter examines the offensive strategies employed by the United States and the Soviet Union in fighting the Cold War. It begins with a discussion of US covert operations and its revised national security strategy, focusing on Operation Solarium, the search for a post-Solarium national security policy, and subversion and intelligence gathering. It then considers the Berlin Crises, noting that Berlin was at the heart of the Cold War, the heart of the German question, and on several occasions became the focus of tension between the two blocs in Europe. The airlift of 1948–9 to preserve the Western position in the city, which was an island in East Germany, had become a potent Cold War symbol. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the Offshore Islands Crises and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Chapter
8. Collapsing Empires: The Cold War Battle for Hearts and Minds, 1953–63
This chapter examines how the United States and the Soviet Union sought to win the hearts and minds of people in various parts of the world as empires began to collapse during the period 1953–63. It begins with a discussion of the end of the French Empire, taking into account the loss of French Indo-China and the start of American involvement in Vietnam, along with the collapse of French rule in Morocco and Tunisia. It then considers the crises in the Congo, Angola, and the Middle East, focusing on the zenith of the Cold War in Black Africa, Britain’s declining power, and the Suez Crisis. It concludes by looking at the end of the British Empire in Africa.
Chapter
6. American foreign policy during the Cold War
Richard Saull
This chapter examines US foreign policy during the Cold War, beginning with an overview of the main historical developments in US policy. It first considers the origins of the Cold War and containment, focusing on the breakdown of the wartime alliance between the United States and the USSR, the emergence of US–Soviet diplomatic hostility and geopolitical confrontation, and how the Cold War spread beyond Europe. It then explains how the communist revolution in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 propelled the US towards a much bolder and more ambitious containment policy. It also looks at US military interventions in the third world, the US role in the ending of the Cold War, and the geopolitical, ideational, and/or socio-economic factors that influenced American foreign policy during the Cold War. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the dual concerns of US foreign policy.
Chapter
25. US decline or primacy? A debate
Christopher Layne, William Wohlforth, and Stephen G. Brooks
This chapter presents two opposing views on the question of whether US power is in decline, and if so, what would be the best grand strategy that the United States need to pursue. According to Christopher Layne, the United States is now in inexorable decline and that this process of decline has been hastened by the pursuit of global primacy in the post-Cold War era. He also contends that primacy engenders balancing by other great powers as well as eroding America’s ‘soft power’ global consensual leadership. On the other hand, William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks insist that the United States remains the sole superpower in the world and that it faces comparatively weak systemic constraints on the global exercise of its power. The chapter considers issues of unipolarity and multipolarity, along with the implications of China’s rise as a great power status for US foreign policy and hegemony.
Chapter
22. The American liberal order: from creation to crisis
G. John Ikenberry
This chapter examines the rise and evolution of the liberal order that was created by the United States and and other liberal democratic states in the decades after World War II, along with the modern challenges to it. The liberal order that emerged after World War II paved the way for a rapid expansion in world trade, the successful integration of former enemies such as Japan and Germany, and the transition to liberal democracy in formerly authoritarian states. Furthermore, the collapse of communism was considered a triumph of liberalism. The chapter first explains how the American liberal order was constructed after World War II before discussing the successes of that order and the end of the ‘socialist’ project in the 1980s. It also analyzes some of the major threats to this liberal order today, particularly those from within, as a result of Donald Trump’s rejection of the American liberal tradition.
Chapter
23. Drifting apart? The emerging end of the transatlantic partnership
Stephen M. Walt
This chapter examines the transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States. It first considers US strategic interests and how they are now changing, along with the implications of this shift for US foreign and defence policy priorities. It then describes some of the fundamental challenges faced by the European Union, including over-expansion, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the euro crisis, a deteriorating regional environment, the persistence of nationalism, and the refugee crisis. It argues that these challenges threaten the liberal order that is one of the West’s most salient achievements, raise serious questions about the EU’s long-term future, and make Europe a less reliable and valuable partner for the United States. The chapter concludes with an assessment of possible prospects for the US-Europe relations, including the (slim) possibility of a genuine renewal in transatlantic ties.
Chapter
4. International history of the twentieth century
Len Scott
This chapter focuses on some of the principal developments in world politics from 1900 to 1999: the development of total war, the advent of nuclear weapons, the onset of cold war, and the end of European imperialism. It shows how the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union became the key dynamic in world affairs, replacing the dominance of—and conflict among—European states in the first half of the twentieth century. It also examines the ways that the cold war promoted or prevented global conflict, how decolonization became entangled with East–West conflicts, and how dangerous the nuclear confrontation between East and West was. Finally, the chapter considers the role of nuclear weapons in specific phases of the cold war, notably in détente, and then with the deterioration of Soviet–American relations in the 1980s.