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How can one understand the problems of collaboration and coordination in the global political economy (GPE)? In situations of global interdependence, individual action by states often does not yield the desired result. Many argue that the solution to the problem of interdependence is to create international institutions. Yet this approach itself raises the issue of how states might go about creating such institutions in the first place. This work examines the conditions under which states might wish to cooperate and provides an introduction to game theory as an approach to understanding interdependent decision-making. It then discusses the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be developed and how they may facilitate international cooperation. Finally, the work examines dimensions of institutional variation, with a discussion of factors that shape the design of international institutions.

The multilateral economic order is facing several major challenges, including the persistent impact of COVID-19 on global output and growth, the shift towards decoupling and fragmentation in economic relations with China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the disruption of global value chains, and the rise of conservative populism. Together these challenge the principles of liberal internationalism and provide a clear illustration of the relationship between trade, finance, international institutions, and the difficulties governments face in coping with the problems generated by complex interdependence. This chapter explores past and emerging challenges in the Global Political Economy (GPE) through a range of theoretical lenses. It also pays attention to the significance of race, colonialism, gender, and the intersections of GPE with everyday life.