This chapter looks at the contribution that rational models of choice can make to foreign policy analysis. It then examines cognitive models that identify the boundaries to rationality in decision making. The chapter then looks at new research in neuroscience that recasts the role of rational models and highlights the importance of emotions. It concludes with suggestions for system design that can improve foreign policy decision making.
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9. Making decisions
Rational, psychological, and neurological approaches
Janice Gross Stein
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3. Cooperation and Conflict in the Global Political Economy
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Cédric Dupont
How can one understand the problems of collaboration and coordination in the global political economy (GPE)? In situations of global interdependence, individual action by states often does not yield the desired result. Many argue that the solution to the problem of interdependence is to create international institutions. Yet this approach itself raises the issue of how states might go about creating such institutions in the first place. This work examines the conditions under which states might wish to cooperate and provides an introduction to game theory as an approach to understanding interdependent decision-making. It then discusses the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be developed and how they may facilitate international cooperation. Finally, the work examines dimensions of institutional variation, with a discussion of factors that shape the design of international institutions.
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7. Foreign policy decision making
Rational, psychological, and neurological models
Janice Gross Stein
This chapter examines the use of rational, psychological, and neurological models in foreign policy decision making. It begins with a discussion of two commonsensical models of rationality in decision making. In the first model, rational decision making refers to the process that people should use to choose. The second, more demanding, models of rational choice expect far more from decision makers. Borrowing heavily from micro-economics, they expect decision makers to generate subjective probability estimates of the consequences of the options that they consider, to update these estimates as they consider new evidence, and to maximize their subjective expected utility. The chapter proceeds by exploring psychological models and the so-called cognitive revolution, the relevance of cognitive psychology to foreign policy analysis, and the ways that the study of the neuroscience of emotion and cognition can be extended to the analysis of foreign policy and to decision making.
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11. Can Terrorism Be Rational?
Max Abrahms
This chapter looks into the rationality of terrorism. It starts off by looking into the paradox of terrorism. Political scientists typically view terrorists as rational political actors. However, empirical research on terrorism suggests that terrorism is in fact an ineffective political tactic. Evidence indicates that in instances where there has been terrorist attacks on civilians, governments rarely grant concessions. This might explain why terrorism is often selected as a tactic only if alternative options are no longer viable. The chapter uses Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as case studies to examine broader patterns of terrorism. Knowing the priority of terrorists is vital for governments when considering counterterrorism actions. Having an understanding of the grievances of terrorists helps political actors predict which targets the terrorists will attack.
