This chapter examines the early stages of mass mobilization in Syria that sparked the Arab uprisings. Starting from December 2010 in Tunisia, Arabs from various walks of life took to the streets in protest against decades-long authoritarian rule, repression, and corruption in what came to be known as the Arab uprisings, or Arab Spring. These waves of protest reached Syria in March 2011. While Syria’s protests initially were largely peaceful, they soon gave way to violence, which culminated in an armed insurgency by the end of 2011 and, combined with regime brutality, a civil war. Before explaining how, when, and why the uprisings happened, the chapter provides a short history of growing popular discontent that resulted in the onset of the Syrian uprisings. It then analyses the roots of the uprising’s militarization and the ensuing popular mobilization and concludes with an assessment of the Syrian civil war.
Chapter
James D. Kiras
This chapter examines two types of irregular warfare: terrorism and insurgency. It first considers the problematic definitions given to irregular warfare, terrorism, and insurgency before discussing the theory and practice of irregular warfare. In particular, it highlights the role of time, space, legitimacy, and/or support in insurgent and terrorist campaigns. It then analyses counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in theory and practice, focusing on three important elements of successful campaigns against insurgents and terrorists, namely, location, isolation, and eradication. It also explores contemporary and future irregular threats and how they are driven by a combination of culture, religious fanaticism, and technology. Finally, it comments on the role to be played by information technology in irregular wars of the future, which some observers expect to be fought in cyberspace.
Chapter
Gary M. Shiffman
This chapter examines the concept of economic security as a framework for analysing and countering organized violence. It first provides a brief historical overview of the economic science of security and applies economic theory to Security Studies. Through various case studies, this approach allows the reader to understand how states leverage traditional economic tools to influence, alter, and deter another actor’s behaviour. The chapter considers three categories of organized violence: warfare, crime, and insurgency. It shows that the various decision makers involved in combating organized violence have different goals and face different constraints. It also describes five vectors of economic incentives: goals, resource constraints, institutional constraints, information, and time. Finally, it discusses four economic tools of security policy: sanctions, trade, finance, and aid.
Chapter
James D. Kiras
This chapter examines two types of irregular warfare: terrorism and insurgency. It first considers the problematic definitions given to irregular warfare, terrorism and insurgency before discussing the theory and practice of irregular warfare. In particular, it highlights the role of time, space, legitimacy, and/or support in insurgent and terrorist campaigns. It then analyses counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in theory and practice, focusing on three important elements of successful campaigns against insurgents and terrorists, namely, location, isolation, and eradication. It also explores contemporary and future irregular threats and how they are driven by a combination of culture, religious fanaticism, and technology. Finally, it comments on the role to be played by information technology in irregular wars of the future, which some observers expect to be fought in cyberspace.
Chapter
Jakana Thomas
This chapter explains the terrorism of insurgents and rebels. Despite the magnitude of transnational terror attacks, most acts of terrorism around the globe are actually perpetrated by assailants that reside in the same country they target. Rebel organizations primarily use violence against civilians to help them achieve their war aims. These can be either political or social. Asymmetric insurgencies or guerrilla wars often use terror to keep members active, civil compliance, maintain territorial control, and demonstrate a state's inability to govern. Violent actors make strategic decisions about the types of violence they utilize during conflicts.
Chapter
Gary M. Shiffman
This chapter provides an economic framework for analysing and countering organized violence. Looking closely at economics as a scientific approach to understanding human behaviour provides insight into the real-life of criminals, terrorists, and insurgents. Individuals make decisions under conditions of scarcity, and markets, firms, and entrepreneurs organize much of human behaviour. Understanding these dynamics can inform how policy-makers, analysts, and operators promote security.
Chapter
This chapter focuses on the pathways through which authoritarian regimes break down. Authoritarian regime exits fall into two general categories. Authoritarian regimes break down as a result of top-down processes initiated by regime insiders, such as military coups and elections. Authoritarian regimes also break down as a result of bottom-up pathways, including protests or insurgencies. The chapter then shows how the mode of regime failure influences a country's subsequent political trajectory. Some modes of exit like coups rarely lead to democratization, while other pathways, like peaceful protest, are more likely to usher in democracy. The chapter also discusses a different type of political transition: the departure of the regime's leader. It traces the pathways of authoritarian leader failure and explains how authoritarian leader exits influence the chance that the regime falls with the leader.
