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This chapter argues that welfare states and labour markets constitute a central issue in European political economy. It then discusses the main theoretical and empirical theories and concepts in regulating social policies and labour markets in the multi-tiered EU institutional setting. Under the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Member States aimed to enhance labour market participation, while modernizing their welfare states and maintaining a high level of social standards. The chapter presents three case studies on social investment. It also looks into the re-regulatory approach embodied in the European Pillar of Social Rights and the possibilities for selected social policies being fiscally supported through the Next Generation EU.

This chapter examines the various attempts to create the economic and monetary union (EMU), which first became an official objective of the European Community (EC) in 1969 but was achieved only thirty years later. The chapter first provides a historical background on efforts to create the EMU, including long-standing debates between France and West Germany on its design, before discussing the launch of the single currency, the euro, and its subsequent progress up to and including the eurozone crisis in the late 2000s. On the eurozone crisis, it considers both the short-term efforts at crisis management and the long-term reforms that were implemented in an attempt to prevent further crises. Finally, it considers some of the explanations for and critiques of EMU, including critiques of the responses to the eurozone crisis that have been offered by various academic commentators.

This chapter focuses on the first years of the European Economic Community (EEC). It describes the early 1960s as a period of apparent success for the supranational elements within the EEC, noting the rapid progress made towards the creation of both a common market and a common agricultural policy. The chapter also examines the crisis sparked by France’s decision to boycott meetings of the Council of Ministers in response to proposals for a more supranational method of funding the EEC budget; the impact of this crisis on the process of European integration; the so-called Luxembourg Compromise; and the Hague Summit. It concludes by discussing the EEC’s expansion of its membership at the start of the 1970s, as well as its first moves towards an Economic and Monetary Union and a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

After twenty years of continuous deepening and widening, European integration has entered an era of recurrent crises. Most students of the European Union (EU) seem to agree that the constitutional equilibrium between intergovernmental and supranational institutions has changed. Some see ‘new intergovernmentalism’ and ‘integration without supranationalization’ prevailing. Others contend that we are witnessing a series of functional and institutional spillovers empowering supranational institutions. This chapter argues that governance approaches are particularly useful to address the puzzling counter-positions represented in the current debate about the ‘nature of the beast’. They are better equipped to explore how and to what end institutional structures and processes have responded to the crises than mainstream integration theories. The chapter starts with introducing the ‘governance turn’ in EU studies as the attempt of EU scholars in the early 1990s to capture the nature of the EU. It then presents a typology that is based on a broad concept of governance as institutionalized forms of political coordination. The empirical part of the chapter uses this typology to give an overview of the structures and processes of EU governance before applying it to the financial and the migration crises. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the major challenges for European integration (theories) from a governance perspective, particularly with regard to managing current and preventing future crises.

This chapter discusses the European Union’s (EU) response to the euro crisis that emerged in late 2009, two years after the global financial crisis struck. It identifies the challenges this crisis has posed to the existing institutional set-up of economic and monetary union (EMU) and shows that it had a lasting impact on dicussions over the EU’s future well beyond its most dramatic moments. A timeline of the euro crisis is provided and the main changes to the institutional framework of European economic governance at the time of writing are reviewed. The chapter considers whether the crisis was caused by a deficit of centralized decision-making and whether it has served, in turn, as a catalyst for deeper economic and political integration in the euro area and the Union more generally. The consequences of the crisis for the EU’s legitimacy are also explored from competing theoretical perspectives.

This chapter introduces economic and monetary union (EMU), describingthe key components of EMU and what happens when countries join. EMU was the result of decades of collaboration and learning, divided here into three periods: 1969–91, from the agreement to creation to its inclusion in the Treaty on European Union (TEU); 1992–2002, from having the plans for EMU to the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates; and 2002 onwards, with EMU established and euro banknotes and coins circulating in member states. The chapter reviews various theoretical explanations, both economic and political, for the creation of EMU and considers some criticisms of EMU. The chapter discusses how EMU has fared under the global financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. These crises highlighted various imperfections in the design of EMU and provided opportunities for further development. This chapter discusses changes made since 2009 to address those flaws and what may be yet to come.