1.1.1 What is the EU?

The EU is, in many respects, one of the most successful efforts in international cooperation in modern history and stands as a unique entity in contemporary global politics. Partly because it is such a unique entity, the EU is not easy to grasp. Before p. 5↵addressing questions such as ‘How does the EU work?’ or ‘What does the EU do?’ it is important to ask a more fundamental question, namely: ‘What is the EU?’ It is more than an international organization but less than a state and yet it shares some of the characteristics of both.

A way to start thinking about the EU involves three things familiar to students of politics: States, Institutions, and Citizens (see Van Middelaar 2013). The EU is a unique combination of the three. It was born of a desire by six states—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—to cooperate internationally in specific policy areas. It thus began as an exercise in diplomacy and it remains, to this day, a system for conducting and managing international relations (IR) between (now 27) states. To facilitate that cooperation, the states set up institutions. Of course, there are numerous international institutions around the world tasked with facilitating cooperation between states on a range of issues from monetary policy to trade, from cross-border crime to climate change. The EU’s institutions are uniquely configured, however, mixing two different types of governance arrangements that can be placed at opposite ends of a continuum: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (Box 1.2).

p. 6↵Intergovernmentalism involves states ‘in situations and conditions they control, cooperating with one another on matters of common interest’ (Nugent 2017: 475). In its purest form, this would involve each state holding a veto, which would ensure that no state would find itself being bound by decisions with which it did not agree. Supranationalism takes IR ‘beyond mere cooperation into integration’ (Nugent 2017: 475). Supranational arrangements involve majority decision-making—where states might have to follow rules and accept decisions that they oppose—and a clear transfer of decision-making authority from the national level to the international level.

It is important to emphasize that these are ideal types of governance arrangement. In other words, the institutions of the EU are neither purely supranational nor purely intergovernmental (see Box 1.3). Some, for example, the European Commission, are more supranational in nature. Others, for example, the Council (of ministers), are more intergovernmental. The EU as a whole, therefore, sits on the continuum between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. There are times when it may appear to be working more intergovernmentally—with powerful states driving forward their policy preferences and convincing weaker states to go p. 7↵along—and times when it may appear to be working more supranationally, with institutions such as the Commission driving events. To study the EU requires being comfortable with the co-existence of these two types of governance. The EU never fully settles into one or the other—they exist in a perpetual state of (mostly creative and constructive) tension.

The concepts of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and national sovereignty are closely entwined when we think about the EU. The relationship of sovereignty to the two types of governance is complicated. It might appear, at face value, that the more supranational the system, the more sovereignty is ‘lost’ by states and, conversely, the more intergovernmental the system, the more sovereignty is retained. However, sovereignty is something to be exercised, or used. A decision by a state p. 8↵to enter into a highly institutionalized form of cooperation with other states—involving the deep integration of their economies—might appear, to some, to represent a giving up (or loss) of sovereignty. Others would look at the decision as an exercising of sovereignty for a common purpose—hence the idea of EU member states ‘pooling’ their sovereignty, rather than ‘losing it’. The debate about national sovereignty in the context of European integration is unlikely to go away. It is a lightning rod for eurosceptic (Box 1.2) political parties.

The tensions and relationships between the member states and the EU’s institutions drive much of what the EU does, as we will see throughout this book. However, as a final point of introduction, it is important to remember that everyone holding citizenship of an EU member state is also a citizen of the EU, a status that was formally created on 1 November 1993 in a revision of the EU’s founding treaties (see Box 1.7). This is a unique feature of the EU. No other supranational or international organization in the world confers citizenship rights on people. EU citizenship may be a secondary status—deriving from national citizenship of an EU member state—but it confers meaningful rights on nearly 450 million people, rights that are enforceable and can be invoked before the CJEU. Those citizens vote every five years in elections to the only directly elected supranational assembly in the world, the European Parliament.

The consent of those citizens to the EU as a system of governance is vital for the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Box 1.2). The expansion of EU competences over time—especially into areas traditionally seen as the responsibility of elected national governments (or ‘core state powers’)—has meant that debates about European integration have become wrapped up in larger political debates. The permissive consensus on the part of most citizens, which characterized earlier periods of integration—at a time when the policies of the (then) EC (see Box 1.1) were largely technical and low-key—has given way to a constraining dissensus as the (now) EU’s power and influence are apparent in more sensitive, visible, and high-profile policy areas (Hooghe and Marks 2009). To study the EU is thus to study a lot more than its institutions and their operations. Studying European integration means posing questions about legitimacy, democracy, law, state–society relations, the interdependence of nation states, the role and power of bureaucracies, and much more.

A Union of 27 member states. A Union comprising six principal institutions, two consultative bodies with legal status, an External Action Service, an Investment Bank, and a clutch of agencies. And a Union of almost 450 million citizens, each with their own opinions and attitudes about how it should evolve. The development of the EU is shaped by a large and diverse number of players, including powerful states—such as the US and China—and powerful corporate interests beyond its borders.

The 2020s are an especially interesting (and challenging) time to study the EU as it struggles with the impact of six interrelated crises that have developed since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007–8 (Riddervold et al. 2021). That crisis brought daily turmoil and a sovereign debt crisis to the Eurozone during much p. 9↵of 2010–12 (Caporaso and Rhodes 2016). Second, events in North Africa and the Middle East produced a refugee crisis that EU member states struggled to deal with throughout 2015–16 (Niemann and Zaunn 2018). Third came the UK’s vote to leave the EU (‘Brexit’—see section 10.2), which was a symbolic and material blow to the EU’s prestige and power. Fourth, the election of Donald Trump as President of the US—with his unpredictable foreign policy and questioning of the US security guarantee to Europe via NATO (Box 1.2)—presented significant new internal and external challenges to the EU during 2017–20 (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019). Fifth, and rumbling in the background since 2012, the EU has faced what some call a ‘values crisis’, as governments in Hungary and Poland passed legislation and enacted policies that undermined some of the bedrock principles of the EU, such as the rule of law and the independence of judges and courts (Kelemen 2020). Finally, in 2020, a global pandemic posed major economic and public health challenges to the EU. Put simply, the period represented one of—maybe even the—most challenging time(s) in the history of European integration.

1.1.2 Why does it matter?

Although understanding the EU is a daunting intellectual challenge, there are (at least) three reasons why it has major pay-offs. First, on a practical level, no one can make sense of European politics without understanding an organization that has daily and powerful effects on European (and non-European) governments, markets, and citizens (see Box 1.4). The way the Union works often lacks political drama. Yet, the EU is responsible for practical, everyday things that make a tangible difference to European citizens, such as a cap on mobile roaming charges and a right to compensation when airline flights are delayed or cancelled. At the more dramatic end of the policy spectrum, the EU has played a leading role over recent years in international action on climate change, fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa, and in international negotiations about Iran’s nuclear programme.

p. 10↵Second, as the most advanced modern experiment in international cooperation, the EU is important analytically. Understanding the EU helps us frame questions about the future of the nation state, the prospects for international cooperation, the effects of globalization (Box 1.2), and the role of governments in advanced industrial societies. The broad dynamics of globalization also entrench the EU’s power. Given that the EU represents around 15 per cent of the global economy, its market regulations have significant power beyond its borders as state and private actors around the world often copy or adapt EU standards because they want to sell into the large and deep EU market—this has been called ‘the Brussels effect’ (Bradford 2020).

Third, the EU is a political puzzle. On one hand, EU governments and institutions have transformed it from a market of six countries into a peaceful, integrated Union of 27 states, with its own currency, a fledgling foreign policy, and a queue of applicant states. Yet a significant minority of citizens appear disillusioned with the EU. In 2005, citizens in two founding member states—France and the Netherlands—rejected a Constitutional Treaty designed to make the EU more efficient and bring it closer to its citizens (see Box 1.5). At the height of the Eurozone crisis, Eurobarometer—a public attitudes survey conducted regularly on behalf of the EU—reported that fewer than half of people across the EU (47 per cent of respondents) felt that their country’s membership of the EU was ‘a good thing’. Reported levels of trust in the EU also fell during this period to a low of around 30 per cent, although the global financial crisis caused trust in national institutions of government to fall noticeably too.p. 11↵

p. 12↵Both measures have since recorded improvements in the EU’s standing. The final Eurobarometer of 2020 found 63 per cent of people responding that their country’s membership of the EU was ‘a good thing’ (with just 9 per cent saying it was a bad thing). Similarly, reported levels of trust in the EU had climed back to 43 per cent although, once again, this trend moved in parallel with higher levels of trust in national institutions. Of course, public attitudes are not static. COVID-19—and especially the EU’s role in the vaccination programme—could impact opinion in 2021 and beyond. Aggregate EU-wide figures mask significant variation across the member states (see section 4.2.2). In the 2019 European Parliament elections, eurosceptic political parties failed to advance as strongly as predicted, although they did win around one-quarter of the seats. Eurosceptic parties performed particularly strongly in France and Italy, two founding member states. The challenge posed to the EU by eurosceptic, populist parties looks set to continue.

This book addresses two central questions about the EU: ‘How does it work?’ and ‘What does it do?’ The first question involves a deeper exploration of the main actors, processes, and dynamics of the EU. How can such a massive, complex, unwieldy amalgam of states, institutions, lobbyists, languages, traditions, legal codes, and so on possibly do much of the governing of Europe, let alone do so efficiently and legitimately? Why does the EU elicit such strong demonstrations of support and antipathy? The second question involves a deeper exploration of why European policies emerge looking as they do. How has the EU’s policy competence evolved and expanded over time? And why?

Students need to understand both the formal rules of EU practice (what the treaties say, what EU legislation stipulates, and so on), and how it really works (how the treaties are interpreted, what informal rules guide action, and other such unofficial ‘rules of the game’). A series of boxes entitled ‘How it really works’ appear throughout the book and are designed to capture this dual dynamic. They illustrate how a particular actor, policy, or process actually works, regardless of the formal rules. The book also includes a range of ‘Spotlight on’ boxes that present either short case studies that highlight a particular aspect of the EU or short focus features that unpack more difficult concepts or policies. Finally, most chapters contain ‘Key concepts and terms’ boxes that define important terms. All chapters close with guides to further reading and useful websites.

1.2.1 Neofunctionalism

Distinctive theories of regional integration, which attempt to explain why states in a certain geographical part of the world embark on economic and political integration, began to emerge in the 1950s. In large part, this was driven by the early stages of European integration—the Coal and Steel Community and then the EEC (see Box 1.1). Given that they seek to explain the decisions and behaviour of states, regional integration theories tend to come from the academic discipline of IR. When applied to the EU, they are primarily concerned with explaining how and why states choose to form European institutions, and who or what determines the shape and speed of the integration process.

In 1958, after the establishment of the EEC, Ernst Haas published The Uniting of Europe, the foundational—and still the classic—text on neofunctionalism as a theory. Haas (and others) sought to explain how a merger of economic activity in specific economic sectors across borders—starting with coal and steel—could create a ‘spillover’ and provoke wider integration in related areas (Haas 1961; Schmitter 1969; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). One form of spillover was functional: for instance, a single internal market was not truly possible without common rules on matters such as competition policy. Moreover, neofunctionalists posited that political spillover would follow and reinforce functional spillover. Political spillover referred to the possibilities created by new institutions at the European level. Actors at the national level (such as interest groups) would ally with corresponding interests across borders and interact directly with EU institutions (the European Commission, for example). Through this process, a new forum for political action—in addition to already existing national forums—would be created. Incrementally, over time, interests and loyalties would shift from the national to the supranational level.

Neofunctionalists, while acknowledging that states must decide to take the first steps on the path of integration, see the supranational institutions and transnational interest groups that subsequently emerge as being significant players in the process of further integration. States are therefore not seen as the only—or even the most—important actors in the process. Supranational institutions have an interest in furthering integration and actively encourage member state governments to integrate p. 14↵in new areas, develop new policies, and delegate to them more authority. The more that states integrate their economies, and the more they work together to make policy through institutions, the more their preferences converge and the easier they find it to make compromises and overcome the purer forms of power politics that often characterize IR. Neofunctionalists have termed these dynamics institutional and social spillover (see Niemann 2006). Collectively, these various forms of spillover are understood as creating a positive feedback loop—further integration reinforces existing integration, and makes even further integration more likely.

Neofunctionalism appeared well suited to explaining the successful early years of integration. However, by 1965, French President Charles de Gaulle was symbolic of the ongoing importance, to many, of state sovereignty and national interests. The mid-1960s were characterized by the so-called Empty Chair Crisis, in which De Gaulle withdrew French participation from meetings of the Council (hence the empty chair) after a variety of Commission proposals that he felt went too far in seeking to advance integration. Supranational institutions were weakened during this period. The nation state had seemingly reasserted itself (see section 2.3.1). In an attempt to adapt their theory to political reality, neofunctionalists offered new concepts such as ‘spillback’ and ‘muddling through’, softening the initial argument that integration was a largely one-way process that symbolized the weakening of states (Schmitter 1970).

Neofunctionalist theory made a comeback in the 1980s and 1990s, as the single market spilled over into environmental policy, consumer protection rules, and a single currency (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). Sometimes called Supranational Governance theory, this later wave of research focused on the importance of delegation by member states to the EU institutions, and the power that gave the institutions to generate integrative momentum (see Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). In addition to the Commission, the role of the CJEU was explored, especially the ways in which it can work to establish and entrench new legal principles that are, broadly speaking, pro-integration (see Burley and Mattli 1993). More recently, it has been used, for example, to explain how a process of spillover and feedback created the Eurozone, and the important role of institutions such as the Commission and the ECB in resolving the Eurozone crisis (Niemann and Ioannou 2015). Neofunctionalism remains a prominent theory, and one that emphasizes a more supranational perspective on the EU—in contrast to its key rival, intergovernmentalism.

1.2.2 Intergovernmentalism(s)

Dissatisfaction with neofunctionalism in the 1960s was reflected in Stanley Hoffmann’s (1966) assertion that the nation state was ‘obstinate, not obsolete’, in Europe as well as globally. The phrase captured the notion that the diversity of national interests might just as easily impede the development of European integration as further it. Coming once again from the discipline of IR, Hoffmann’s approach became known as intergovernmentalism, in part because it shifted the focus back p. 15↵to negotiations and bargaining between the member states. Hoffmann (1995: 1–6) also identified with realism, one of the most prominent IR theories. However, his realism was nuanced and often at odds with the central tenets of the dominant form of IR realism—neorealism (or structural realism).

Neorealism has had relatively little to say about European integration (for an exception, see Grieco 1995). Its emphasis on the primacy of states, its understanding of states as unitary and rational actors with fixed and often conflicting goals, and its pessimism about the positive impact of international institutions jar with the essence of the EU—its institutions and cross-border interest groups and its demonstration of the complexity of international politics and the ability of states to cooperate and compromise. Neorealism tends to view international politics through the lens of military and security issues, downplaying the importance of economics. For example, Rosato (2011) offered a neorealist account of European integration that identified the Cold War security threat posed by the Soviet Union—and not the post-1945 imperative of boosting economic growth—as the key factor determining decisions by the original six member states (and then more member states later) to press ahead with integration. The term realist intergovernmentalism is often applied to those who see European integration as driven overwhelmingly by member state governments in the pursuit of greater security and strategic autonomy. Andrew Moravcsik (2013) has criticized Rosato’s provocative account on both historical and methodological grounds.

That critique rested in part on a competing theory, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (Moravcsik 1993). This built on Hoffmann’s foundations and conceptualized the EU as a form of ‘two-level game’ taking place at the domestic level (or, rather 27 domestic levels) and the EU level. LI contends that it is the preferences and power of EU member states that drive the integration process. The theory is ‘liberal’ because it assumes that economic interests, and not just security interests (as neorealists often argue), motivate and drive European states. LI considers how national governments bargain with various domestic interest groups (especially economic ones) to produce a broad coalition in support of their policy agenda. Unlike neorealists—who treat the state as a ‘black box’ and tend to make assumptions about state preferences—liberal approaches look inside the state to understand the power dynamics shaping policy preferences. The theory is ‘intergovernmental’ because, at the EU level, it conceptualizes national governments as bringing their preferences to a bargaining table with the outcome being a reflection of the relative power of each member state.

Moravcsik emphasizes national power, package deals, and the ability to make side-payments to reluctant—often weaker or smaller—member states. EU institutions and transnational alliances of interest groups are afforded little role, marking a key distinction between LI and neofunctionalism. LI sees no significant feedback mechanism at work that pushes integration forwards. Rather, it sees the member states as always in control—they might collectively empower the EU’s institutions as a way to attain their preferred policy outcomes but they retain the ability to curb the reach and the activity of those institutions. Moravcsik’s historically impressive work, The Choice for Europe (1998), confines itself to the major decision points in p. 16↵the EU’s history. It does not—and is not intended to—account for much of the day-to-day activities of the EU. It approaches the Union as a subsystem of IR and one that is dominated by (the most powerful) states.

Debates between variations of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism—with its more supranational focus—continue to shape academic debates about the nature of EU integration (see the debates, for example, in Hooghe and Marks 2019). The tensions and debates among scholars between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are a reflection of the tensions within the EU itself, which were outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Given the unique architecture of the EU, these tensions will persist—both in theory and in practice.

The most recent development in this area of theory is new intergovernmentalism, which explores how member states have dominated the process of EU integration since the Maastricht Treaty, which was where Moravcsik’s history ended (Puetter 2014). Building on Moravcsik’s arguments, new intergovernmentalism has explored how deeper integration has occurred without necessarily entailing supranationalism. For example, during the Eurozone crisis, new institutional structures were set up through signing intergovernmental treaties, rather than amending the EU treaties. As European integration has become more politically contentious—the shift from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’—member state governments have grown more cautious, and arguably more creative, in advancing integration (Bickerton et al. 2015a: 710).

1.2.3 Postfunctionalism

Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009) identified the shift from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ as the starting point for their postfunctional theory of European integration, which takes its inspiration less from IR and more from the study of domestic politics and the analysis of public opinion and party politics. Two points should be noted at the outset, both of which offer insights into the essence of postfunctionalism. First, recalling the distinction that opened this chapter, if neofunctionalism emphasizes institutions, and intergovernmentalism emphasizes states, postfunctionalism places the citizens of the member states—their identities, values, and understandings of political community—at the heart of how we understand integration. Second, whereas neofunctionalism contained an assumption that the often technical (or functional) nature of integration meant it could proceed largely insulated from the cut-and-thrust of national politics, postfunctionalism sees the EU as having become increasingly ‘politicized’ since the early 1990s (hence post-functionalism). As the EU has gained new competences in areas associated with core state powers—currency, borders, security, foreign affairs—it has become harder to insulate integration from national politics. Postfunctionalism is therefore yet another theoretical reflection of how the EU has evolved over time.

For postfunctionalists, the feedback effect is not (mostly) positive—as neofunctionalists contend—or non-existent—as liberal intergovernmentalists contend. Rather, it is often and increasingly negative. That dynamic arises from a mismatch between the territorial scale at which policy is made and the territorial scale at p. 17↵which meaningful political communities exist. Neofunctionalists suggested that functional spillover would eventually trigger political spillover, albeit with a time lag. Postfunctionalists argue that while functional spillover has progressed, and the EU has become responsible for more policy, political spillover has happened far less than predicted. While it may be more efficient to make policy at the territorial scale of 27 member states, people’s identities, values, and sense of political community remain more nationally oriented. As the gap between function and politics grows, existing tensions in the system grow louder and new ones emerge.

Not only has political spillover happened far less than predicted, it has happened unevenly. This is because European integration creates winners and losers, as do all political systems and public policies. For Hooghe and Marks, the politicization of the EU requires a greater theoretical focus on the attitudes and identities of citizens and how that shapes the EU’s 27 party-political systems. Populist, right-wing parties have been successful in a number of EU member states, in part by criticizing the EU and developing eurosceptic narratives. Those parties can work together across borders, and in institutions such as the European Parliament, to frustrate EU integration. A new political dividing line has emerged—that overlays the traditional right-wing/left-wing one—between people who feel that they have benefited from European integration, whether economically or culturally, and those who feel that they have lost out from it.

Some member states may, in turn, end up with more eurosceptic governments—either because eurosceptic parties join governing coalitions or because governing parties move to combat a perceived electoral threat by co-opting eurosceptic ideas and language. Even if not adopting their language, member state governments facing electoral competition from populist, eurosceptic parties may feel constrained, fearing the domestic political ramifications of what happens in Brussels. This is the negative feedback. It can undermine the EU’s legitimacy and, thus, the potential for future integration. Member states where more people possess a strong sense of national identity, or feel less European, or feel like economic or cultural ‘losers’ of integration—or where populist, eurosceptic parties are more effective political forces—are more likely to seek opt-outs, become disconnected, disrupt the way the EU works, or leave altogether (as the UK did—see section 10.2). Thus might begin a process of unravelling and dis-integration (Vollaard 2014; Leruth et al. 2019).

Postfunctionalism brings out the importance of ideas, values, and identities in shaping European integration—alongside material concerns about economic growth, welfare, and/or security that are explored by neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. This is not unique to postfunctionalism. It is at the core of a broad approach to political science that has had much to say about the EU—constructivism.

1.2.4 Constructivist approaches

What unifies constructivists is their focus on the role and power of ideas in shaping political preferences. The ways in which rules and norms are socially constructed are an important guide to political behaviour (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 393). p. 18↵Political actors think about the consequences and outcomes of their actions, but also about what action is appropriate in a given situation. What is appropriate is a function of identity, values, and norms—all of which become embedded over time—and of social pressures. Constructivism is not a theory of integration but, as a broad approach to studying politics, it has been applied to various aspects of the EU, from how member states engage with European integration at the highest levels (Parsons 1999), down to how policy is made on a day-to-day basis (Saurugger 2013).

At the highest level, consider the following example: at the end of the Cold War, some predicted that a reunified Germany would seek to rearm—including with nuclear weapons—and would emerge once again as a security threat to its European neighbours, thus jeopardizing the integration project (Mearsheimer 1990). That prediction was premised on the notion that states seek to enhance their power and security and—if they are capable—to dominate others. Those who took the power of ideas seriously observed that Germany had, since 1945, reconstructed its national identity as a reluctant—or ‘tamed’—power (Bulmer and Paterson 2010). The nature of its reconstruction after World War II was inextricably bound up with the European project, and its collective sense of national memory militated the pursuit of active or aggressive defence postures. The post-1991 reality chimes with an approach that takes identity, norms, and ideas seriously.

At a less macro-level, constructivist research has explored the extent to which Commission officials are socialized in a supranational way (Kassim et al. 2013), or the extent to which actors can learn from prior interactions and alter their preferences accordingly (Checkel 2001). Constructivism thus shares neofunctionalism’s concern with new arenas for socialization and processes in which actors redefine their interests as a result of interacting with the EU and its institutions. Such interactions take us into the realm of day-to-day policy-making, an aspect of the EU that is researched using a variety of approaches drawn from the discipline of public policy. In that respect, the EU as an arena for making policy can be studied using tools that are applied to policy-making in national capitals.

At its heart, the constructivist tradition illuminates the many—sometimes clashing—‘big ideas’ that make up, represent, and challenge the EU as a governance structure, location, and community. As Box 1.2 illustrates, some of these big ideas are about the procedures by which the EU has decided to govern itself, balancing integration and supranationalism with sovereignty and intergovernmentalism. Other ideas are about how the EU ought to develop—the idea of a federal Europe (Box 1.6) has given significant impetus to the project of integration since its beginnings but, for those of a more eurosceptic persuasion, the EU ought to become looser and more intergovernmental. Still others refer to the substance of the norms that the EU uses to hold itself (and others) to account, and the values it attempts to work within in its key policies, as enshrined in its treaties. Ultimately, the ideas that constitute, influence, and shape the EU are continually shifting, being challenged and reworked within the fluid constructs of an evolving Union.

1.2.5p. 19 Public policy approaches

Public policy is a sprawling subfield of political science (see Cairney 2019) and this section can barely scratch the surface. Two specific approaches from public policy literature have been applied extensively to the EU as policy system: p. 20↵institutionalism andandand policy networks. Institutionalism em emerged as part of a broader move in political science in the late 1980s and 1990s (Hall and Taylor 1996; Pollack 2005). It was applied fruitfully to the study of the EU to the point where, arguably, institutionalism became the leading theory of EU policy-making (see Cowles and Curtis 2004).

There are several varieties of institutionalism. Discursive Institutionalism shares much with constructivism in emphasizing how ideas and values can shape policy preferences—even when that means doing harm to material interests. Using the example of Germany’s approach to the Eurozone crisis, Matthijs (2016) explored how the German government’s strict adherence to a set of ideas about national budgetary restraint and economic austerity helped exacerbate the very crisis it sought to end. Germany’s position of power helped to embed these ideas in the EU’s institutions. Similarly—and using the example of policy-making in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis—Schmidt (2014) explored how a process of dialogue and argument helped change the preferences of policy-makers in member states and within key EU institutions.

Historical institutionalism focuses on the impact of institutions over time and specifically how institutions, once established, can shape and constrain the behaviour of the actors who established them (Pierson 1996; Armstrong and Bulmer 1998). It therefore has a lot in common with neofunctionalism. Political institutions and even policies, once established, can become subject to path dependency. Political actors often naturally stick with established institutions and policies as they increasingly learn how to operate with, and within, them. Institutions, and policies, are thus said to be ‘sticky’; that is, once established, they tend not to change. Consider the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which persevered for many years despite intense criticism. The idea of starting again on a long, time-consuming, and expensive root and branch reform of the CAP was resisted. Instead, incremental adaptations were made. Verdun (2015) traced how the EU response to the Eurozone crisis involved an incremental layering of new policies and institutions onto existing arrangements. Historical institutionalists use the concept of a critical juncture to explain periods of more significant—as opposed to incremental—change (Bulmer 2009).

Finally, much of the work of developing policy takes place in policy networks (Peterson 2003; Jordan and Schout 2006—see section 5.3). Sectoral policy networks in the EU bring together institutional actors (from the Commission, Council, and Parliament) and other stakeholders such as representatives of private firms, public interest groups, technical or scientific experts, political campaigners, and national officials who are working on (or affected by) the same issues. Networks lack hierarchy. There is no one actor in charge. They rely instead on resource exchange. As a result, participants need to bring some valued resource to the table with which to bargain. That resource could be information, ideas, money, constitutional-legal power, or political legitimacy. According to network analysts, bargaining and resource exchange among these actors, rather than strictly intergovernmental bargaining, determine the shape of actual EU policies (see Kingah et al. 2015).

p. 21↵Approaches grounded in public policy do not tell us much about the grand bargains struck between national governments, the history-making decisions, such as treaty reform, that set the broad direction of European integration. But they help guide exploration of the behind-the-scenes negotiation and exchange that shapes EU policy day to day.

1.2.6 Different theories, different insights

When studying anything as complex as the EU, we need conceptual tools to guide us. Theories simplify reality and allow us to see relationships between the things we observe. There are no ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ theories, but there are more or less appropriate theories and concepts to apply depending upon the question being explored. Each offers different insights about key features of the EU: how integration evolves; the way policies are made; the role of different actors in the process; and so on. Reflecting that, the chapter on member states, for example, uses intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism to structure its analysis, whereas the chapter on policy-making features a discussion of public policy literature. Theories can be thought of like lenses at an optician’s—sometimes it might be helpful to layer one on top of the other to bring reality into clearer focus, rather than squinting harder through the first lens you are offered. Readers need not master all these theories to use this book. Rather, these insights are meant to encourage thinking about theory and its role in helping us understand and evaluate European integration and EU politics.

1.3.1 Experimentation and change

Since its conception in the early 1950s, European integration has been an ongoing process without an agreed end-state (van Middelaar 2013). In one sense its development has been a functional, step-by-step process: integration in one area has led to pressures to integrate in others. As neofunctionalists would point out, the EU p. 22↵has developed from a free trade area to a single market, and from a single market to an economic and monetary union. These developments, however, have not been smooth or automatic. Rather, the EU’s development has progressed in fits and starts, the result of constant experimentation, problem-solving, and trial and error. A customs union required a common external tariff, which required a common position on trade negotiations, which meant addressing foreign policy considerations. European foreign policy evolved, from the failed attempts of the 1950s (see section 2.2.2), to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the late 1990s (see section 8.4).

The EU’s actors have reacted to immediate problems, often successfully, but not always coherently nor always predictably, and the nature and intensity of change are also varied. Constitutional change takes place through intergovernmental conferences (IGCs)—special negotiations in which government representatives come together to hammer out agreements to adapt or alter the EU’s founding treaties, and which require national ratification by all. The first (resulting in the 1951 Treaty of Paris) created the ECSC with six members. Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty (ratified in 2009) was designed to consolidate and streamline a Union of (then) 27 members, with the possibility of it growing still further to 30 or more (see Box 1.7). Less spectacularly, legislative change has taken place through thousands of EU directives and regulations. Finally, the EU’s institutions, especially the European Commission and Court of Justice, and the member states, have themselves acted as instigators of change, through their interpretations of the treaties and of legislation as well as through informal agreements and practices supplementing them. The point is that change is a constant in the EU. This book explores its main sources and implications.

p. 23↵As Box 1.1 explained, the Maastricht Treaty not only revised the Treaty of Rome (which it renamed as the treaty establishing the European Community), but also agreed the broader TEU. The EU’s treaties are the basic toolkit of ministers, European commissioners, parliamentarians, and civil servants dealing with EU matters. Each piece of legislation is based on one of these treaty articles (of which there are more than 400). The treaties have grown increasingly long and complex and are hardly an easy read. To improve the presentation, and facilitate the reading of the treaties, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 renumbered the articles. The failed Constitutional Treaty of 2004 was intended to simplify the existing texts and make them more readable. The Lisbon Treaty made a more modest attempt at simplification and, although the term ‘constitution’ was dropped, the treaties were consolidated, with a shorter more readable TEU setting out the main principles, institutions, and procedures, leaving the complex detail to the (renamed) Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU).

1.3.2 Power sharing and consensus

Our second theme concerns power and how it is shared between different actors and across layers of government. The EU policy-making system lacks a clear nexus of power: there is no powerful ‘EU government’, nor is there any formalized ‘official opposition’. Instead, power is dispersed across a range of actors and levels of governance (regional, national, and supranational). Deciding which actors should do what, and at what level of governance, is a matter of ongoing debate within the EU. But, whenever possible, the Union seeks to act on the basis of broad consensus.

The three most important sets of actors are the member states, the EU institutions, and organized interests. Certainly, much about the evolution of the EU has been determined by the member states themselves, and in particular their different approaches to integration. Some member states want deeper integration, others do not, some have changed their view over time or as their governments change, and some want more integration in some fields but less in others. Such divisions continue to shape the speed and form of the integration process. Meanwhile, EU institutions have shaped integration as they vie for power, with the member states as well as among themselves. Finally, organized interests—including representatives of subnational levels of governance, private interests, and citizen groups—play an increasingly large role.

Part of what makes the EU unique—and certainly different from its member states—is that these actors exist in a complex web where there are established patterns of interaction but no overall ‘ruler’, government, or even dominant actor. Instead, actors must bargain and share power in an effort to reach an agreement acceptable to all, or at least most. This dynamic has been captured in the term multi-level governance (Box 1.2), which suggests a system of overlapping and shared powers between actors on the regional, national, and supranational level (Hooghe and Marks 2001). EU governance is thus an exercise in sharing power between states and institutions, p. 24↵and seeking consensus across different levels of governance. Coming to grips with this unique and changing distribution of power is a key task of this book.

1.3.3 Scope and capacity

Our final theme concerns the expanding remit of the EU, and its ability to cope with it. The EU has undergone continuous (in a phrase used by insiders) ‘widening and deepening’. The widening of its membership has been astonishing. It has grown from a club of six member states (West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) to nine (UK, Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1973), to 12 (Greece joined in 1981; and Portugal and Spain in 1986), to 15 (Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined in 1995). Then, in 2004, the EU membership jumped to 25 following the accession of ten mainly Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 took the EU to 27 members, with Croatia becoming the 28th (pre-Brexit) in 2013. Although the UK has left, additional countries—North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and in theory Turkey—are candidate states (section 9.3.2). The institutional, political, economic, and even linguistic challenges that enlargement poses are immense (see Box 1.8). The EU has also ‘deepened’ in the sense that the member states have decided to pool sovereignty in an increasing number of policy areas. Such developments mean that the EU is managing tasks that have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of the nation state.

p. 25↵At the same time the EU continues to try to shed its image as an ‘economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm’, a depiction attributed to a Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens. The EU is trying to stamp its authority on the international scene through its leadership on issues such as climate change and the Iranian nuclear programme. A CFSP has been developed that, according to the treaties, ‘might lead to a common defence’ (Article 24 TEU). These developments have challenged the EU’s capacity—its practical and political ability to realize its ambitions. While the EU has taken on more members and more tasks, its institutional and political development has not kept pace. This mismatch—between the EU’s ambitions on one hand and its institutional, budgetary, and political capacity on the other (see Hill 1993)—raises questions about the EU’s future. It also represents the third theme of the volume.

Taken together, these three themes address:

These three themes provide the glue necessary to hold together our investigation of the EU and how it works.